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in mind, the article then considers the various laws in Hong Kong pertaining to 
data protection, with a focus on the aspects relating to identity management. It 
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1 Introduction 
Hong Kong is famous as a crowded city. Being a fairly mountainous place, livable space 
is relatively scarce and most humans live in close contact with one another. In laymen’s’ 
eyes, privacy may thus be viewed as a luxury that one cannot always afford, rather than 
an absolute right that is automatically available to all. It is in this context that the ideas of 
privacy and identity management are examined in this article. What is the relationship 
between identity management and privacy protection, and how do these notions apply  
to the unique socio-economic landscape of Hong Kong? This article considers these 
questions, as a backdrop for an examination of the data protection framework in Hong 
Kong. To what extent is the notion of identity management promoted under the data 
protection laws in Hong Kong? What is the position of identity management (and indeed 
individual privacy protection) in relation to other socio-economic goals in Hong Kong? 
This article seeks to explore these questions, and ends with some recommendations as to 
how to improve identity management within the context of data protection in Hong Kong. 
2 The concepts of privacy and identity management 
2.1 Privacy 
Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997, during which she was returned to China.  
It is now administered as one of the Special Administrative Regions of China.  
Culturally, Hong Kong retains strong Chinese roots, with the celebration of many 
Chinese festivals and with the majority of the population having the Cantonese dialect  
as their first language. Nonetheless, Hong Kong is an international financial centre  
with a cosmopolitan outlook. It seeks to be ‘Asia’s World City’. This slogan best 
embodies the dual nature of Hong Kong as an international city with a strong Asian 
focus. The concept of privacy in Hong Kong must thus be viewed in the light of this 
cross-cultural background. 
The relationship between Hong Kong and China is governed by the Basic Law of  
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (‘Basic 
Law’). This is basically a constitution-like document that sets out the relationship 
between the central Chinese authorities and Hong Kong. It also embodies certain  
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fundamental rights of Hong Kong residents, including Articles 28 (relating to  
personal privacy), 29 (relating to territorial privacy) and 30 (relating to privacy of 
communication). Notions of privacy are thus recognised under the Basic Law. 
However, this must be viewed against the realities of Hong Kong’s socio-economic 
landscape as an East Asian financial centre. One aspect of this is the crowded nature of 
Hong Kong which serves as a practical limit on the amount of territorial privacy that an 
individual may have. Another aspect is the importance of Confucian values in China as a 
whole.1 Social harmony, resulting from every individual knowing his place in the social 
order and fulfilling his part, is a key theme in Confucianism. While not expressly against 
individual privacy, Confucianism does emphasise the importance of overall societal 
good. Thus the significance of privacy as a goal in itself is tempered to some extent by 
traditional Chinese viewpoint which places greater emphasis on other values.  
Finally, it must be born in mind that Hong Kong is a very much pragmatic business 
society. One of the key reasons why laws promoting privacy have been adopted in  
Hong Kong is that Hong Kong may retain its place as a key financial centre. For 
example, in the report by the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong on ‘Reform of the 
Law relating to the Protection of Personal Data’ (August 1994) it is stated as follows: 
“If Hong Kong is to retain its status as an international trading centre, it is  
vital that it participates in the burgeoning international exchange of personal 
data. Increasingly, its capacity to do so will depend on its satisfying other 
countries that it offers an adequate level of legal recognition of the data 
protection principles.”2 
Therefore, we can see from this that the significance of privacy recognised not so  
much as an end in itself, but as one of the means by which the legal infrastructure of 
Hong Kong may be built to ensure its credibility as an international trading centre. 
2.2 Identity 
“Unlike a drop of water which loses its identity when it joins the ocean,  
man does not lose his being in the society in which he lives. Man’s life is 
independent. He is born not for the development of the society alone, but for 
the development of his self.” B.R. Ambedkar3 
Identity is a multi-faceted concept. At its most basic level, it embodies the idea of the  
self as an entity as distinct from others. In this sense it is therefore a relative concept.  
The idea of identity can be expanded to take the form of group identity, focusing on  
the characteristics that distinguish one group from another. On a broader scale, it also 
encompasses the ideas of corporate identity or even national identity. Thus, what 
constitutes ‘identity’ can encompass a wide variety of factors, including one’s race, tastes 
and orientation. The line between a factor constituting ‘identity’ and a mere attribute is of 
course a blurred one. 
The concept of identity is one that is loaded with significance. A strong sense of 
identity carries with it ideas of personal pride. Identification with a group can bring with 
it feelings of collectiveness and community. In Hong Kong, following the handover in 
1997, residents have to accept being identified not only as Hong Kong people, but also 
people of Mainland China.4 
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On a more prosaic level, a discussion of identity in Hong Kong would be incomplete 
without mention of the Hong Kong identity card (‘ID card’). Residents in Hong Kong are 
required to register for an identity card, except those who are excluded or exempted 
under the Registration of Persons Ordinance and its regulations. ID cards can be used  
for immigration purposes, as well as for borrowing library books. In addition, ID card 
holders can store in their identity cards a personal e-Cert issued by the Hong Kong  
Post Certification Authority. The e-Cert may be seen as the users’ online identity card. 
The e-Cert may be used for a whole host of public and commercial purposes, including 
electronic banking and trading, secured e-mail, government services and online 
entertainment.5 The legal framework with regard to ID card numbers will be considered 
later in this article. 
2.3 Identity management 
Proper identity management ensures that particulars constituting the identity of an 
individual are not stolen, abused or misused. An obvious example of this is the 
prevention of identity theft. It also involves ensuring that only selected individuals are 
allowed access to computer systems and databases. The primary driving force behind 
identity management initiatives is the promotion of trust. Users must be assured that the 
information that they give online is private and confidential. A strong framework for 
identity management is required so that there is sufficient confidence in e-commerce  
and other online transactions. Companies and governments need to ensure that access to 
their various systems and databases is confined only to authorised persons. This issue is 
particularly important in the context of the availability of inter-government department 
access to separate department databases, particularly with the increasing use of computers 
in governmental procedures. The preservation of control over information and systems 
can thus be seen to be one of the cornerstones of identity management. 
Closely linked to the concept of identity management is the idea of transparency. The 
fact that one can remain anonymous on the web encourages creativity and free speech. In 
the world of e-commerce, trading partners may not be particularly concerned about the 
identity of whom they are trading with, so long each side is able to fulfil their respective 
sides of the bargain. However, the problem with anonymity is that it makes for lack of 
transparency and accountability. This in turn results in a tempting environment for 
activities such as money-laundering and terrorism financing.  
2.4 The intersection between identity management and the  
privacy protection 
The question then is whether the concept of identity management is synonymous with 
privacy protection. To address this question, we first have to consider the connection 
between identity and privacy. As can be seen from the discussion above, an individual’s 
identity is essentially a positive concept that is concerned with self-definition in contrast 
to others. In contrast, the idea of privacy can be seen as largely a negative concept, 
namely the absence of interference with one’s person, territory, data or communication.  
It has been said that “privacy is most appreciated in its absence, not its presence” 
(Chadwick, 2006). Generally, it is fair to say that the concealment of one’s identity by 
means of anonymity or the use of pseudonyms would give more privacy. An individual’s  
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privacy is inextricably connected with self, and therefore the concealment of self-identity 
would result in greater individual privacy. It would thus follow that better identity 
management would generally lead to greater privacy. 
However, privacy is clearly a far broader concept than identity. The Australian Law 
Reform Commission has identified four privacy interests,6 namely: 
1 the interest of the person in controlling the information held by others about him, or 
‘information privacy’ 
2 the interest in controlling entry to the ‘personal place’ or ‘territorial privacy’ 
3 the interest in freedom from interference with one’s person or ‘personal privacy’ 
4 the interest in freedom from surveillance and from interception of one’s 
communications, or ‘communications and surveillance privacy’. 
The first privacy interest (‘information privacy’) clearly includes the control of 
information regarding an individual’s identity. Similarly, protection of the fourth privacy 
interest (‘communications and surveillance privacy’) incorporates privacy with regard to 
one’s identity in one’s daily life and communications.  
However, ‘territorial privacy’ and ‘personal privacy’ are concerned with the 
preservation of individual physical integrity, and are not so much concerned with 
individual identity as tangible spatial autonomy. Especially in a crowded city, it is 
entirely possible for one to be largely unidentified and anonymous in daily transactions as 
‘one of a crowd’ while still having limited personal or territorial privacy.  
The interplay between privacy and identification was illustrated in the Hong Kong 
Court of Appeal case of Eastweek Publisher Ltd v Privacy Commissioner for Personal 
Data (2000) 1 HKC 692. The applicants in this case (Eastweek Publishers) published a 
popular magazine called ‘Eastweek’. An article in September 1997 involved photographs 
of various women in public, taken without their knowledge or consent. None of the 
women featured in the report were fully named. One of the photographed women then 
complained to the Hong Kong Privacy Commissioner that she was upset by the negative 
comments made about her attire in the magazine.  
At the Court of Appeal, Ribeiro JA expressed sympathy for the complainant and 
observed that she ‘would be entirely justified in regarding the article and the photograph 
as an unfair and impertinent intrusion into her sphere of personal privacy’. However  
the majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that there had been no contravention of the 
Data Protection Principles in the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) (‘PDPO’) 
as Eastweek was indifferent to the identity of the complainant. The case also illustrates 
the point that identity is a matter of perspective. The fact that the complainant in the 
photograph might have been identified by her friends was not sufficient for the majority 
of the Court of Appeal, which took the view that the crucial factor was whether the data 
user (Eastweek) was concerned with the identity of the women photographed. The further 
legal ramifications of this decision will be considered later in this article. However, it 
suffices to say here that this case shows how one may be regarded as insufficiently 
identified, and yet have one’s privacy undeniably and publicly invaded. 
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3 Legal framework 
3.1 Overview of the personal data (privacy) ordinance 
Having considered the conceptual overlaps and distinctions between privacy protection 
and identity management, we now turn to consider whether the current legal framework 
in Hong Kong sufficiently provides for and promotes identity management. The focus of 
this paper is personal data protection. 
The primary piece legislation in Hong Kong in this regard is the PDPO, which came 
into effect in 1996. As stated in its long title, this is an Ordinance to protect the privacy of 
individuals in relation to personal data. The core of the PDPO is a set of Data Protection 
Principles, set out in Schedule 1 of the Ordinance. These relate to the purpose and 
manner of collection7 of personal data, the accuracy and duration of retention of personal 
data,8 the use9 and security10 of and access11 to personal data. These principles must not 
be contravened12 by data users13 unless expressly allowed under the Ordinance.14 
The PDPO also provides for the establishment15 of the Privacy Commissioner  
for Personal Data (‘PCPD’). The functions of the PCPD are (amongst others) to monitor 
and supervise compliance with the PDPO.16 The PCPD is empowered to issue Codes of 
Practice.17 He maintains a Register of Data Users,18 conducts inspections, handles 
complaints and carries out investigations19 in connection with the PDPO.20 
Various offences are stipulated under the PDPO.21 In addition, an individual who 
suffers damage (including injury to feelings) by a contravention of the PDPO may claim 
compensation from the data user.22 However, the efficacy of this right is somewhat 
watered down by the fact that it is defence to show that the data user had taken such care 
as was reasonably required to avoid the contravention concerned.23 In addition, it has 
been pointed out that a further hurdle is that individuals have to hire their own lawyers as 
the PCPD cannot assist in litigation.24 
The crux of scope of the PDPO is the definition of ‘personal data’, which is defined 
in Section 2 of the PDPO as: 
“any data- 
(a) relating directly or indirectly to a living individual; 
(b) from which it is practicable for the identity of the individual to be directly 
or indirectly ascertained; and 
(c) in a form in which access to or processing of the data is practicable.” 
(emphasis added) 
‘Data’ is in turn defined in Section 225 of the PDPO to include a ‘personal identifier’ 
‘Personal identifier’ is defined in the same section as: 
“an identifier- 
(a) that is assigned to an individual by a data user for the purpose of the 
operations of the user; and 
(b) that uniquely identifies that individual in relation to the data user, but does 
not include an individual’s name used to identify that individual.” 
(emphasis added) 
It can be seen (particularly from the italicised portions of the respective definitions) that 
the general notion of ‘personal data’ in the PDPO recognises to some extent the concept 
of identity management. However, some ambiguities exist. For example, what data might 
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‘uniquely’ identify an individual in order to constitute a ‘personal identifier’ is a question 
of degree. On the one hand, a Hong Kong ID card number should clearly satisfy this 
requirement. On the other hand, a “written description of a man called David Lee, aged 
30 and (living) in Tsimshatsui26–27 probably would not. However hypothetically speaking, 
what if it was somehow known to the data user that there was only one person fitting  
this description? What if the area in question was reduced to one street, or one apartment 
block? It is thus a question of fact in the individual case as to what constitutes ‘personal 
identifiers’ under the PDPO. 
Another ambiguity lies in limb (b) of the definition of ‘personal data’, which 
stipulates that in order for data to constitute personal data, it must be data ‘from which  
it is practicable for the identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascertained’. 
It is not clear whose point of view such identification is to be ascertained. Would it be 
sufficient if the ‘data user’28 is able to ascertain the identity of the individual? Or is it 
sufficient if any person (not necessarily the data user) can do so? The significance of this 
question is of interest in the context of pseudonymous data, which will be considered in 
the next section.  
In addition to the general provision as considered above, several specific provisions 
of the Ordinance reflect the notion of identity management. For example, a report 
published by the PCPD following an inspection or investigation shall be so framed as to 
prevent the identity of any individual being ascertained from it.29 In addition, a data user 
shall refuse to comply with a data access request if the data user cannot comply with the 
request without disclosing personal data of which any other individual is the data subject, 
unless the data user is satisfied that the other individual has consented to the disclosure.30 
Thus, it appears that the provisions of the PDPO do recognise, to some extent, the 
importance of identity management. However, a specific issue with regard to identity 
management is the extent to which pseudonymous data is protected. The next section 
considers the extent of such protection offered under the PDPO.  
3.2 Pseudonymous data 
The concept of pseudonymous data derives from the use of pseudonyms that mask the 
true identity of the data subject. There are many examples of pseudonyms online,  
for example, e-mail addresses. People may use pseudonyms in order to maintain a degree 
of anonymity in their online transactions, thus retaining for themselves a greater degree 
of privacy.  
If there is true and complete anonymity in the sense that the individual behind  
the data cannot be traced by any means, then there would be no identifiable individual  
to protect. Such information would not fall within the scope of ‘personal data’31 under  
the PDPO. 
The position is less clear when it comes to pseudonymous data and it would depend 
on the particular case. For example, if the individual is well-known and goes by a public 
pseudonym, it is arguable that such pseudonymous data would constitute data relating 
directly to an individual ‘from which it is practicable for the identity of the individual to 
be directly or indirectly ascertained’,32 thus falling within the definition of ‘personal data’ 
in the PDPO. In contrast, if it is impossible for the pseudonym to be linked to any 
individual, that is akin to anonymity and would not be within the scope of the PDPO.  
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What of pseudonymous data that the data user is able to link to an individual, though 
the general public would not be able to do so? The key issue is whether limb (b) of the 
definition of ‘personal data’ is satisfied, namely, whether it is ‘practicable for the identity 
of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascertained’. As mentioned above, this 
definition does not explicitly clarify whether it is sufficient that the identity of the 
individual is ascertainable only by a data user and no one else. However, it is submitted 
that data should constitute ‘personal data’ if the data user alone is able to ascertain the 
identity of the individual. To impose more stringent requirements in limb (b) of the 
definition of ‘personal data’ would be to read in extra requirements into the statute, and 
limit the efficacy of the PDPO as a means of privacy protection. 
IP addresses are regarded as a form of pseudonymous data, insofar as they pertain to a 
particular computer. However it is unclear whether IP addresses would fall within the 
definition of ‘personal data’ under the PDPO. While IP addresses relate to a particular 
computer, various individuals may use that computer, possibly without the ISP account 
holder’s permission. This problem is exacerbated by the advent of wireless networks 
which may accessed without authorisation.33 The problem is one of accurate attribution, 
in the sense the ISP account holder is not necessarily the person using the computer  
at all times. On this basis, it is arguable that IP addresses relate to a particular  
computer, rather than an individual, and are thus not ‘personal data’ within the PDPO. 
The counter-argument to this is that IP addresses do relate to the ISP account holder, and 
would thus constitute ‘personal data’ on a literal reading of the definition, despite the fact 
that the account holder may not be the actual user at the relevant time.  
The office of the PCPD has previously expressed the view that an IP address alone 
does not satisfy the definition of ‘personal data’ in the PDPO, but that if the IP address  
is combined with identifying particulars of an individual, from which it is practicable  
for the identity of the individual to be ascertained, the IP address may become part of  
the ‘personal data’.34 However, this view still does not address the question of who  
must be able to ascertain the identity of the individual in order for the data to constitute 
‘personal data’.35 It is also worth noting the views of the Working Party on the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (‘Working Party’) set  
up under the European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (‘EU Data Protection 
Directive’).36 The Working Party has generally considered IP addresses as data relating  
to an identifiable person, thus constituting ‘personal data’ within the definition in  
Article 2(a) of the EU Data Protection Directive.37 Nonetheless, the ambiguities with 
regard to IP addresses reveal the difficulties in the application of the technologically 
neutral tones of the PDPO to online technologies.  
3.3 ID card numbers 
The ID card number is a form of pseudonymous data that is ubiquitous in Hong Kong. 
Whilst in other jurisdictions the proposed introduction of ID cards has met with criticism 
and scepticism, in Hong Kong they have long been accepted as part of daily life. 
However, the use of ID cards should give rise to some degree of concern over privacy 
invasion. This is exacerbated by the recent introduction of the e-Cert (as mentioned 
above), which allows a wide variety of transactions to be carried out with the ID card.38 
ID card numbers clearly fall within the definition of ‘personal identifier’28 in the 
PDPO. Indeed, it was noted in the publication by the PCPD entitled ‘Your Identity Card 
Number and Your Privacy’39 that ‘by far the most commonly used personal identifier in 
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Hong Kong is the ID card number’. ‘Data’28 is defined in the PDPO to include ‘personal 
identifiers’. The issue then is whether ID card numbers constitute ‘personal data’28 under 
the PDPO, in particular, whether ID card numbers are data ‘from which it is practicable 
for the identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascertained’.40 Pertinent to 
this issue is the question (earlier discussed) of whose point of view the identification of 
the individual is to be ascertained, in order for data to constitute ‘personal data’. Whether 
an ID card number is ‘personal data’ under the PDPO would depend on the facts of each 
case. A data user in possession of an ID card number alone but with no information as  
to the name of the person to whom the number has been assigned, might not be able to 
ascertain the identity of the individual. However, if the view is taken that data can be 
regarded as ‘personal data’ as long as the individual’s identity can be ascertained by any 
person (not necessarily the data user), then the ID card numbers should still fall within 
the definition of ‘personal data’. If ID card numbers constitute ‘personal data’ under the 
PDPO, then the Data Protection Principles therein would apply.  
In addition to the general provisions of the PDPO, a Code of Practice on ID  
Card Numbers and other Personal Identifiers (the ‘ID Card Numbers Code’)41 has  
been issued by the PCPD. As stated in the accompanying Compliance Guide for Data 
Users, the Code gives practical guidance to data users on the application of the PDPO  
to the collection, accuracy, retention, use and security of ID card numbers and other 
personal identifiers (such as passport numbers, employee numbers, patient numbers  
and examination candidate numbers). The Code provides (among other things) that  
no data user may compulsorily require an individual to furnish his ID card number  
unless authorised by law, and that the data user should consider whether there are less 
privacy-intrusive alternatives to the collection of such numbers.42 Non-compliance with 
the ID Card Numbers Code does not of itself render the data user liable to any civil or 
criminal proceedings.43 However, a breach of the ID Card Numbers Code would give rise 
to a presumption against the data user in legal proceedings under the PDPO.44 
For completeness, it must also be noted that the Registration of Persons Ordinance 
(‘RPO’) provides some further protection. Pursuant to the RPO, particulars furnished to a 
registration officer may be used only for the purpose of enabling the Commissioner45 to 
issue ID cards and to keep records on such particulars. Moreover, these records may be 
used only for the following purposes, namely: 
“(i) enabling verification of identity of individuals by public officers in 
discharge of their official duties; 
(ii) enabling verification of identity of individuals for any other lawful 
purposes; or  
(iii) such purposes as may be authorized, permitted or required by or under 
any Ordinance.”46 (emphasis added) 
The phrase ‘lawful purpose’ is not defined in the RPO and its meaning is unclear. For 
example, if the records are used to verify the identity of an individual in order for a 
private civil claim to be made against him, is that a ‘lawful purpose’? We can only infer 
that what amounts to a ‘lawful purpose’ should be broader than what is specified in 
paragraphs (i) or (iii). However, the potentially broad interpretation that could be given to 
the phrase ‘lawful purpose’ compromises the protection for particulars of individuals in 
records maintained by the Commissioner. 
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A similar problem may be observed in Section 12 of the RPO. Pursuant to that 
section, any person who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, gains access to, 
uses or discloses any records kept by the Commissioner shall be guilty of an offence.47 
The RPO does not provide further details on what would constitute a ‘reasonable excuse’ 
or ‘lawful authority’ under this section.48 In particular, the question of who would  
have the power to confer ‘lawful authority’ on the otherwise offending individual is  
left unanswered.49 
Having considered the various relevant legislative provisions, we can now turn to 
several judicial decisions that have affected the scope of application of the PDPO, 
particularly in relation to the issue of identity management. 
3.4 Personal data collection 
In the case of Eastweek Publisher Ltd v Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (the 
facts of which are discussed above), the majority of the Court of Appeal found that it was 
of the essence to the act of personal data collection under the PDPO that the data user 
must be compiling information about an identified person or about a person whom the 
data user intends or seeks to identify. As this element was absent on the facts, it was 
found that there had not been an act of personal data collection.  
It is not an express requirement of the PDPO that personal data collection necessarily 
involves the data user having identified or intending to identify the data subject.  
The majority of the Court of Appeal has thus narrowly interpreted the notion of personal 
data collection in the PDPO. Consequently, this decision narrows the scope of identity 
management under the framework of the PDPO. Unless the data user had identified or 
was intending to identify the data subject, the act of data collection would not fall within 
the scope of the PDPO, even if the identity of the individual is clearly discernable from 
the information (as it was in this case with the photograph).50 
3.5 Applications to court relating to identity of online copyright infringers 
The interplay between privacy and identity has been seen in several recent Hong Kong 
cases involving applications by members of the recording industry against Internet 
Service Providers (‘ISPs’) for the disclosure of information on the identity of internet 
subscribers who were allegedly involved in infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyright.  
The Court of First Instance case of Cinepoly Records Co Ltd & Others v Hong  
Kong Broadband Network Ltd & Others51 [‘Cinepoly 1’] before Deputy Judge Poon  
was described by the learned judge as ‘the first of its kind ever brought in Hong Kong’.52 
In that case, seven leading music producers brought an action against four ISPs  
for the names, Hong Kong ID card numbers and addresses of 22 alleged online  
copyright infringers.  
That case was swiftly followed by another similar application in Cinepoly Records 
Company Limited v Hong Kong Broadband Network Limited [HCMP 943/2006] 
[‘Cinepoly 2’] for the disclosure of the full names, postal addresses and ID card numbers 
of 49 internet account subscribers. In both these case, the relief sought by the music 
producers was granted.53 
These issues in these cases are significant because, as Deputy Judge Poon put it,  
they ‘(bring) into focus the very fine and delicate balance that the court needs to  
strike between the administration of justice and protection of privacy relating to  
personal data’.52 
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These cases involved alleged copyright infringement using ‘Peer-to-Peer’ (‘P2P’) 
technology.54 The Court noted the widespread use of such P2P software in Hong Kong, 
and the deleterious consequences that such usage for the music industry. In particular, the 
Court noted that the extent of copyright violation was so extreme that the plaintiff’s 
viable existence was very much at stake. 
The Court then emphasised the nub of the problem which was the ‘cloak of 
anonymity’55 that infringer could hide his identity behind in the use of P2P software. As 
the parties who were infringing the copyright could not be identified, copyright holders 
were left in a helpless position.  
However, this ‘cloak of anonymity’55 could be pierced with the help of information 
from the ISPs, matching the IP address at the relevant time, with the ISP’s records of  
its subscribers’ particulars including their names, ID card numbers and postal addresses. 
The court stressed that this was the only way that the plaintiffs could proceed against the 
alleged copyright infringers.  
The plaintiffs thus sought Norwich Pharmacal discovery against the ISPs.56 The 
Court discussed the essential elements for the granting of such relief, and concluded  
that each of these elements had been satisfied. The first element was that serious  
tortious or wrongful activities had been committed. The Court found that this was  
the case as there had been copyright infringement under the Copyright Ordinance.57 In 
particular, the Court noted that some of the downloaded songs had not yet been made 
commercially available. 
The second element was whether the subscribers could reasonably be assumed to be 
the copyright infringers. The Court noted that there could be multiple users to an internet 
account and thus the subscriber might not have been the individual who wrongfully 
downloaded the material. However, the Court took the view that it was reasonable to 
infer that the subscriber could have consented or authorised others to use his internet 
account to download the material. The third element, relating to the ISP’s innocent 
involvement in the uploading, was also clearly established.  
The Court then considered what it termed to be ‘the most important question in this 
action, namely, how to strike the balance between the administration of justice and 
protection of privacy relating to personal data’.58 In carrying out this balancing exercise, 
the Court had to consider the application of the provisions of the PDPO. The information 
sought by the plaintiffs was clearly ‘personal data’ within the definition in Section 2  
of the PDPO.59 The issue then was whether Norwich Pharmacal relief was available in 
such circumstances.  
The relevant Data Protection Principle was Principle 3, pursuant to which personal 
data should not be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which the data were to 
be used at the time of data collection, or a purpose directly related thereto.  
However personal data is exempt from Principle 3 if the use of the data is for the 
purpose of ‘prevention, preclusion or remedying (including punishment) of unlawful  
or seriously improper conduct, or dishonesty or malpractice, by persons’60 and if the 
application of Principle 3 ‘would be likely to prejudice’61 such purpose. The Court found 
that the phrase ‘unlawful or seriously improper conduct’ covered tortious conduct, 
including copyright infringement. Thus the exemption from Data Protection Principle 3 
was applicable. 
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The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to deprive a victim wronged by 
tortious conduct of Norwich Pharmacal relief when the information sought was personal 
data within the meaning of the PDPO. To quote Justice Poon: 
“Norwich Pharmacal discovery is a well-established equitable relief. Nothing  
in the Ordinance…suggests that this entrenched relief is removed when the 
information sought is personal data within the meaning of the Ordinance. The 
Legislature could not have intended to alter the law by a sidewind.”62 
As mentioned above, Cinepoly 1 was followed shortly after by another similar 
application which was granted in Cinepoly 2. However, in granting the application in 
Cinepoly 2, Judge Chan emphasised that each of the plaintiffs would only be entitled  
to the information of the identity of those uploaders who had infringed each of their 
respective copyrights. His Honour clarified that if there should be no infringement by any 
uploader of the copyright of any particular plaintiff, the information of that uploader 
should not be disclosed to that plaintiff as there was no justification for that disclosure.  
Overall, these cases are instructive as an indication of the Hong Kong approach  
to the proper balance between data protection (an aspect of which includes identity 
management) on the one hand, and the protection of other competing interests. The 
anonymity that is afforded by P2P software clearly has its advantages. Users are free to 
download material without fear that their choices (and by implication their tastes, 
preferences and personal orientation) will be traced back to them. However, where such 
activity involves the committing of civil wrongs, the balance then swings to protect 
intangible property rights, such as copyright. 63 
This approach is clearly set out in the ‘timely reminder’64 issued by Justice Poon at 
the end of his judgment in Cinepoly 1: 
“Some online copyright infringers may well think that they will never be 
caught because of the cloak of anonymity created by the P2P programs. They 
are wrong. And from now on, they should think twice. They can no longer hide 
behind the cloak of anonymity. The court can and will, upon a successful 
application, pull back the cloak and expose their true identity. It is not an 
intrusion into their privacy. It does not even lie in their mouths to say so. For 
protection of privacy is never and cannot be sued as a shield to enable them to 
commit civil wrongs with impunity (emphasis added).”64 
This is perhaps illustrative of the pragmatic approach towards the right to privacy in 
Hong Kong.65 The decision in this case is clearly in favour of commercial interests, 
namely copyright protection. It contributes towards the building of a business-friendly 
legal infrastructure in Hong Kong. It can be inferred from this decision that weight will 
be given to the protection of commercial interests, as against the protection of 
confidentiality of one’s identity.66 
Identity management is an integral aspect of most information systems. To this end, 
the protection of identity is important from a commercial point of view. However, it can 
be seen from this case that privacy is merely one factor in the economic equation and 
may be displaced if other commercial interests are found to take precedent. 
4 Recommendations 
From the discussion above, it is clear that while there has been some tangential account 
taken of identity management in the formulation of Hong Kong’s laws on data protection, 
the particular issue of identity management has not been directly addressed. Having 
P
-Pr nt
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Technology, privacy and identity – a Hong Kong perspective 13    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
discussed the importance of identity management in today’s digital age (in particular the 
need to provide for integrity with regard to identity in order to promote trust), it is 
suggested that the theme of identity management requires and deserves to be addressed 
and emphasised as a specific factor in the ongoing development of Hong Kong’s data 
protection regime. 
Several recommendations flow from this overall point. Firstly, it is suggested that 
there be more emphasis on the collection and use of anonymous or pseudonymous data 
where identification of individuals is not required. This reiterates a view held by other 
writers.67 Paragraph 1(c) of the Data Protection Principles in the PDPO provides that the 
data collected should be adequate but not excessive in relation to their intended purpose. 
However, the legislation should go further to specify that where identity is not required, 
only anonymous data be collected. If pseudonymous data would suffice without the 
actual identity of the individual being collected, it should then be specifically provided 
that the collection is restricted to such pseudonymous data. This approach is reflected in 
the data protection regimes of some other jurisdictions.68 A hint of this can already be 
found in the ID Card Numbers Code (as discussed above), pursuant to which the data 
user should consider whether there are less privacy-intrusive alternatives to the collection 
of such numbers. 
Secondly, it is suggested that the definition of ‘personal data’ in Section 2 of the 
PDPO be clarified as to who must be able to ascertain the identity of the individual  
in order for data to constitute ‘personal data’. In this regard, reference can be made to  
the UK Data Protection Act (‘UK DPA’). Pursuant to Section 1(1) thereof, ‘personal 
data’ means data which relate to a living individual who can be identified from those 
data, or from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely 
to come into the possession of, the data controller.69 It can be seen that, as regards data 
that has to be combined with other information in order for an individual to be identified, 
the relevant point of view is the data controller. In the context of the PDPO, the 
corresponding party would be the data user.70 Such an approach would promote certainty 
as to the proper scope of ‘personal data’ under the PDPO. In contrast, a somewhat wider 
and looser formulation may also be observed in the European Union Data Protection 
Directive. Recital 26 thereof provides that ‘to determine whether a person is identifiable, 
account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the 
controller or by any other person to identify the said person’. In order to increase  
the scope of ‘personal data’ and to fully meet the objective of the PDPO to protect 
privacy, it is suggested that the wider formulation in the EU Data Protection Directive is 
to be preferred. In addition, there appears to be no reason in principle why a 
determination of whether data is ‘personal data’ should be restricted only to information 
in the possession of the data controller. 
It must finally be noted that identity management can only be brought to the forefront 
of data protection if there is awareness and education among businesses, technology 
developers and the general public with regard to this issue. In this regard, it is suggested 
that the PCPD take a pro-active role in the promotion of public awareness of identity 
management issues.  
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5 Conclusion 
Throughout this paper we have considered the scope of identity management in the 
context of the data privacy regime in Hong Kong. Hong Kong holds a unique place in 
Asia, being a successful Chinese financial centre and also until 1997 a British colony. In 
the light of this history and culture, there are special nuances attached to the ideas of 
privacy and identity. The growing importance of identity management calls for special 
focus on it as a distinct issue in the context of data protection. Whilst ideas of identity 
management are to some degree encapsulated within the overall data privacy framework, 
there is still room for greater protection of information relating to an individual’s identity. 
The first step is to recognise identity management as a specific factor that must be 
addressed directly, rather than tangentially, within the data protection framework. 
Identity management (and indeed privacy protection) are not absolute rights and will 
always jostle with other goals for precedence, as the Cinepoly cases illustrate. However, 
it is important that the concept of identity management be given greater recognition in 
Hong Kong, in order for there to be a robust and comprehensive legal infrastructure for 
the promotion of trust in this technological age. 
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